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INTRODUCTION

"[T]he recent GATT panel report on the European Community's
challenge to three U.S. automobile laws laid to rest fears that WTO
panels will interpret the GATT in a way that challenged [sic] our
ability to safeguard our environment."'
Debate has raged over the compatibility of increasingly liberalized
trade under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with
environmental protection. Whether the GATT system has limited a
country's ability to pass laws to protect its own environment or the
global commons, the very success of the GATT system will increase the
need for environmental protection, at least in the short run. By opening
markets, the GATT/World Trade Organization (WTO) system will increase living standards all over the world.2 As people gain greater
wealth, they will use more electricity and purchase more cars. This will
place greater strain on the environment. Although the GATT/WTO
system may not pose the dangers to the environment that many have
claimed,3 even some of its strongest supporters believe that it should be
improved to become more compatible with environmental protection.4
Ambassador Kantor's comment above reflects a sensitivity to concerns
about the effect of international trade rules on a nation's ability to enact
environmental law.
The GATT panel decision in the case United States - Taxes on
Automobiles3 (CAFE case) promised to fuel the debate about the effect
of international trade rules on environmental protection. This panel
examined three U.S. laws relating to the sale of autos: the luxury tax,
the gas guzzler tax, and the Corporate Average Fuel Economy law
(CAFE law). This Note focuses on the decision with regard to the
CAFE law because it plays a central role in the United States' effort to
address environmental problems. The CAFE law requires manufacturers
1. Letter from Michael Kantor, U.S. Trade Representatie, to Senator Howard M.
Metzenbaum, Congressional Press Releases, Nov. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Allnws File.
2. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON, EcONOMICS 668-91 (10th ed. 1976).
3. See, e.g., Patti A. Goldman, Resolving the Trade and Environment Debate: In Search
of a Neutral Forum and Neutral Principles, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1279 (1992).
4. The creation of the Committee on Trade and the Environment with the WTO indicates
that the institution itself recognizes the importance of environmental protection. See Jennifer
Schultz, Environmental Reform of the GA7T/WTO International Trading System, 18 L. &
ECON. REV. 77, 80 (1994).
5. Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Taxes on Automobiles, Oct. 11,
1994, 33 I.L.M, 1397 (1994) [hereinafter CAFE Panel Report].
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of autos to meet certain minimum fuel efficiency standards for the entire
fleet of autos that they sell in the United States.
The dispute settlement panel did find important elements of the
CAFE law to violate the GATT, but found much of the law to be compatible with the GATT. Ambassador Kantor clearly regarded the decision as evidence that the WTO should be adopted The Office of the
Trade Representative called the provisions that were found to be incompatible with the GATT "technical," and decided that since the effect of
the law was "trade neutral," the United States would not amend the
CAFE law.6 Many opponents of the WTO similarly concluded that the
panel decision on CAFE did not support their argument that the WTO
would limit efforts to protect the environment.7 Few voiced concern
about the panel's decision.8 The widespread approval of the panel decision by environmentalists is odd considering that key elements of the
CAFE law were found to be incompatible with the GATT.
There are some elements of the panel report that support those who
believe that the GATT/WTO system can be compatible with strong
environmental protection. 9 The panel's interpretation of the Article XX(g)
general exception to the GATT promises to allow greater application of
those general exceptions for environmental matters. At the same time,
however, the panel decision presents much to worry about with regard to
the compatibility of the WTO and environmental concerns. The panel
noted that although the CAFE law, as such, did not violate the GATT,
two provisions of the law were found to be incompatible with the GATT.
These provisions, though perhaps "technical," are vitally important.
Without these provisions, the CAFE law would be severely weakened.
The CAFE law promotes energy efficiency which, beyond conserving resources, also reduces the emission of greenhouse gases. Despite
elements of the law that have been deemed protectionist, it, as a whole,

6. GATT Panel Rejects Key EU Challenges to U.S. Fuel Conservation Measures, BNA

Nat'l Env't Daily, Oct. 4, 1994, available in LEXIS, BNA Library, Bnaned File.
7. Peter Behr, Trade Panel Upholds U.S. Auto Fuel Law: Challenge on Behalf of
European Car Manufacturers is Rejected, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1994, at DI ("In a statement
yesterday, [Ralph] Nader's Public Citizen organization said the CAFE ruling shows that
global trade panels are free to 'micro-manage' U.S. environmental laws. The statement was

later withdrawn after organization lawyers read the entire ruling.").
8. For one of the few pieces emphasizing that the panel found the CAFE law to be
inconsistent with the GATT, see Paul Stanton Kibel, GA7T Fouls the Air, RECORDER, Nov.
14, 1994, at 8.
9. Although this paper will not discuss the decision with regard to the "gas guzzler" tax,
it is worth noting that the panel found it to be compatible with the United States' obligations
under the GATT. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 6.1. The gas guzzler law imposes
a tax on manufacturers of cars that do not meet minimum fuel efficiency standards. 26 U.S.C.
§ 4064 (1994) (gas guzzler tax).
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damages U.S. manufacturers' ability to compete with foreign producers.
The law placed U.S. automakers at a competitive disadvantage with all
its major competitors. By requiring U.S. automakers to sell a fleet of
cars that averaged over twenty miles per gallon, it called for expensive
changes for U.S. producers that most foreign producers did not have to
make.' The provisions found to violate the GATT were an effort to
lessen the harmful effect this law would have on the competitiveness of
domestic producers.
This Note examines the CAFE case in the context of the debate over
trade and the environment. It argues that the panel decision has aspects
that support the notion that the international trading system can be
compatible with efforts to protect the environment, and also has aspects
that demonstrate that these do indeed clash, limiting efforts to protect
the environment. Part I of this Note describes the CAFE law and places
it in the context of domestic and international efforts to prevent global
warming. Part II examines the panel's decision, arguing that the panel
acted well within the scope of past practice in interpreting Article III,
and notes how that practice can result in a situation in which imported
products are given better treatment than domestic products. Part II also
examines the panel's findings with regard to the exceptions under Article XX. It points out that the panel's suggestion that part of the law that
violates Article III could be saved represents an important breakthrough
in GATT panel interpretation. Part III of this Note describes what the
CAFE law would look like if the United States were to make it compatible with the GATT. This demonstrates that if the United States had to
change the law to comply with the panel's recommendation, the CAFE
law might not survive. Part IV presents a proposal to change GATT
interpretation of Article XX(g). It argues that previous panels have
interpreted the exception too narrowly because they have examined
individual provisions of the law in isolation from the overall effect. By
examining the overall effect of the law on trade - and providing that it
does not discriminate on balance - panels can make the exception
viable while protecting against protectionism.

10. In 1978, shortly after the CAFE law went into effect, autos produced abroad and sold
in the United States averaged 27.3 miles per gallon; U.S.-made autos averaged 18.7 miles per
gallon. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 3.262.
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I. CAFE

AND THE ENVIRONMENT

A. The CAFE Law
1. Statutory Scheme
In 1975, when the CAFE law was passed by Congress, the United
States was in the midst of the energy crisis it suffered after the OPEC
oil embargo in 1973. Gas prices skyrocketed and some areas experienced shortages of oil. At the time, it appeared as if the crisis would
worsen. Quite a few people projected dire consequences for the U.S.
economy if energy consumption were not reduced dramatically." Oil
received special attention from Congress. 2 Thus, the CAFE law was
primarily a response to a concern for energy conservation. Only later
13
were its benefits for the environment touted as a major achievement.
The CAFE statute requires auto manufacturers to meet a minimum
fuel economy standard for all cars they sell. The law currently requires
automakers to sell cars that average twenty-seven and one half miles per
gallon for passenger vehicles, and twenty-one miles per gallon for light
trucks. 14 Each car need not meet these minimum levels; rather, the entire
fleet of autos or light trucks sold by each producer must meet these
standards. In other words, large low gas mileage cars can be offset
against smaller higher mileage cars in order to meet the minimum. This
is accomplished through the so-called "fleet averaging" provision. This
was one of the two provisions that the European Community 5 challenged and that the panel found to be incompatible with the United
States' GATT obligations. This provision requires the calculation of a
11. President Ford stated in January, 1975 that "[w]e face a future of shortages and
dependency which the nation cannot tolerate and the American people will not accept." 31
CONG. Q. ALMANAC 173 (1975) [hereinafter Ford Statement].

12. See generally 31 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 220-25 (1975).
13. The CAFE law may yield other benefits as well. For example, exposure to "manganese, which is contained in vehicle exhaust emissions[,] ... has been linked to violent
behavior in prisoners." The FebruaryAlmanac, THE ATLANTIC, Feb., 1995, at 18.
14. The lower standard for light trucks is another source of tension with regard to foreign
producers. U.S. automakers dominate sales of light trucks, which for this calculation includes
minivans and recreational vehicles. Some argue that the lower CAFE standard for this
category of vehicles effectively protects U.S. manufacturers. DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING OF
THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE FUTURE 269 (1994). The Panel did not address

this argument, though the EC raised the issue. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 3.254.
15. At the time the complaint was filed what is now called the European Union was
called the European Community. The GATT panel describes that party as the European
Community and this Note will also do so when discussing the panel's reasoning. European
Union or EU will be used when discussing actions taken since the group changed its name.
See Howard LaFranchi, 'European Union' Takes Over for EC, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,

Dec. 13, 1993, at 3.
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manufacturer's fuel economy by averaging
the gas mileage of cars sold
16
fleet.
import
its
and
fleet
domestic
in its
Each automaker's cars are placed into one of two categories in
determining the fleet average, depending on where the car is produced.
The separation of autos into a domestic fleet and an import fleet is
accomplished through the "fleet accounting" requirement. 17 This provision was the second element challenged by the EC. Autos that are
domestically produced - which means at least seventy-five percent of
the value of the car has come from the United States - are placed in
one category; while imported cars - any car made of less than seventyfive percent U.S. value added - are placed in another category. The
nationality of the automaker is not important in determining the fleet;
the location of production is. An auto manufactured in the United States
by a foreign company would be defined as a "domestic" car if it met the
value added requirement.' 8
In addition to the requirements for foreign fleet accounting and fleet
averaging, there is a system of credits and waivers that can be applied to
determine an automaker's corporate average fuel economy. Credits are
offered to reward producers who innovate in ways that protect the
environment. For example, fuel economy for cars powered by less
polluting alternative fuels is calculated differently from the fuel economy of cars powered by gasoline. 9 The statute exempts "specialty"
automakers that sell fewer than 10,000 cars per year in the United
States.2" These producers are exempt because they do not have the
resources to invest in the costly technology necessary to meet the fuel
economy standards.
The CAFE standards are enforced by a penalty that increases as an
automaker's average fuel economy decreases. 2' Automakers are punished
proportionally to how close or far they are to the CAFE requirement.

16. 49 U.S.C. § 32904(a)(l)(B), § 32904(b) (1994) (calculation of average fuel economy).
17. 49 U.S.C. § 32904(b).
18. No EC manufacturer produces a car in the United States that is classified as "domes-

tic." ,There are a number of cars produced by Japanese companies that are considered
"domestic" for CAFE purposes. Rik Paul, USA vs. the World. Domestic or Import? The Beat
Goes On, MOTOR TREND, Feb. 1995, at 70. There is no universally agreed formula for
determining domestic content and it is a matter of much dispute. The U.S. government has
three different ways of determining domestic content. The Environmental Protection Agency

has one that is used in the CAFE calculations. The Federal Trade Commission has a different
one that is used in tariff administration. A third formula is used in meeting the requirements
of the American Automobile Labeling Act. Id.

19. 49 U.S.C. § 32905 (1994) (manufacturing incentives for alternative fuel automobiles).
20. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(d) (1994) (average fuel economy standards).
21. 49 U.S.C. § 32912(b) (1994) (civil penalties).
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Manufacturers who do not meet the CAFE standards must pay a penalty
of five dollars for each tenth of a mile below the standard for each car
sold in the United States.22
2. Effect of the CAFE Law
a. Effect on the U.S. Auto Market
The CAFE law intended to promote fuel efficiency by both encouraging automakers to develop more efficient technology and by providing
an incentive for U.S. automakers to build and sell more small cars. Both
of these goals would have been undermined if U.S. automakers could
have purchased small cars from abroad and resold them under U.S.
nameplates in the United States. 23 At the time the CAFE law was approved, the United States was at a severe disadvantage competitively in
the small car market with regard to both European' producers and Japanese producers. Congress feared that unless the fleet accounting provision was included, U.S. manufacturers would meet the CAFE requirements by purchasing small cars produced abroad and reselling them in
the United States, thus offsetting the low fuel efficiency of the large cars
it produced in the United States.24 Purchasing and reselling imported
small cars would have been the preferred Option because U.S.
automakers claim that they actually lose money on small car production
25
in the United States.
Were U.S. companies permitted to resell small foreign cars they
would have had no need to make expensive investments in increasing
fuel efficiency. U.S. automakers have spent billions of dollars over the
past twenty years to meet these requirements. Ford, for example, estimates that it spent twelve billion dollars over one ten-year period to
ensure that it met the CAFE requirements.26 U.S. automakers have often
begrudgingly undertaken this task and have consistently claimed that
this law has hurt their ability to compete with foreign producers. 27 Yet,
they have developed technology that has improved the fuel efficiency of
all cars they have sold.

22. Id. The Secretary of the Department of Transportation may impose additional penal-

ties in certain situations. 49 U.S.C. § 32912(c) (1994).
23. See, e.g., Jeffery Atik, Complex Enterprises and Quasi-Public Goods, 16 U. PA. J.

INT'L Bus. L. 1, 37 (1995); Ted Orme, "Made in America" Labels Bring Confusion, Controversy, MOTOR TREND, Nov. 1994, at 26.
24. 121 CONG. REC. H18700 (daily ed. June 12, 1975) (statements of Reps. John D.
Dingell and Phil Sharp).

25. America's Carmakers:An Exhausting ime, ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 1990, at 76.
26. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 3.232.
27. 46 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 280 (1990).
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In addition to the "technology forcing" aspect of the law, CAFE
provides incentive for a market-based approach to meeting the requirements. As the cost of making marginal improvements in technology
increases and it becomes more expensive to make large cars more fuel
efficient,2" automakers can meet the CAFE requirements by selling more
small domestic cars. 29 As with the incentive to improve technology, the
incentive to require auto companies to sell small cars has worked - the
sales of small cars produced in the United States has increased since the
CAFE law took effect.3 0 Again, it is important to note that the sales of
small cars has come at a cost to U.S. manufacturers. Apparently, U.S.
auto companies are "full-line" producers 31 in large part to ensure that
they meet the CAFE standards.
But if the goal of the CAFE law was protectionism, it has failed in
certain respects. By separating domestic cars from foreign cars sold by
U.S. automakers, the CAFE law created an incentive to produce some
larger cars abroad. U.S. companies, through joint ventures, have imported cars and resold them under U.S. nameplates. Because these cars in
practice have been small high-mileage vehicles, the foreign fleets of
U.S. automakers have easily exceeded the CAFE requirements. The
CAFE law does not reward automakers for averages in excess of the
minimum; as a result, there is an incentive for a U.S. producer to build
lower mileage cars abroad in order to take advantage of the surplus over
the CAFE minimum and to move them out of the domestic category,

28. The gas guzzler law sets a minimum level of fuel efficiency for each individual car,

below which automakers are subject to fines. 26 U.S.C. § 4064 (1994).
29. The fleet accounting provision can be challenged as a violation of Article III most
persuasively for this effect. As the EC noted in its argument to the GATT panel, Congress
acknowledged this problem. A report approved by the House of Representatives Ways and
Means Committee stated that Congress rejected a direct tax on low mileage cars because "of
the danger of a major loss of jobs ... [and the Committee] did not want to provide a
stimulus to increased imports of autos, in view of the depressed state of the U.S. auto
industry." CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 3.266; see also Peter Behr, Trade Case
Poses Threat to Environmental Law, GATT, WASH. POST, June 10, 1994, at Fl. The United

States was not concerned about competition from large cars from Europe - it was concerned
about Japanese small car imports. See, e.g., 121 CONG. REC. S22851 (daily ed. July 15, 1975)
(statement of Sen. Robert W. Griffin) ("I am very concerned that one of the effects of the
enactment of this legislation is to encourage even greater sales here in the United States of
imported automobiles in the period immediately ahead.")
30. In 1978, the smallest autos (subcompacts) made up 8.8% of sales of U.S.-produced
cars. In 1990, the smallest cars made up 11.8% of those sales. MVMA MOTOR VEHICLE
FACTS & FIGURES '91, at 16 (1991). Cf Al Rothenberg, OPEC Proves It's a Small World,
After All; Big 3 Woes Bring CAFE and Rebates, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Oct. 18, 1993, at

30-31. Cf. ECONOMIST, supra note 25 and accompanying text.
31. In the terminology of the CAFE Panel Report, "full-line" producers make and sell

both large and small cars. See CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 3.56.
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which is weighted toward larger cars.32 Ford has done this. In 1989, it
moved a portion of the production of the Grand Marquis, one of its
biggest cars, to Canada so that its domestic content would fall below
seventy-five percent and thus be classified as an import for CAFE
purposes. The sole reason for the move in production, according to
Ford, was the CAFE requirement.33 Likewise, Nissan, a Japanese company, has been discouraged from adding more U.S. content into the
production of the Sentra because it does not want it to become classified
as a "domestic" car under the CAFE standards. 34 If it were to be classified as a domestic car, it would face CAFE penalties.
b. Effect on the Environment
The CAFE law has been extremely effective in meeting its environmental goals. The average fuel efficiency of an auto driven in the United States has nearly doubled since the early 1970s. 35 In 1978, autos sold
in the United States averaged eighteen miles per gallon; less than a
decade later, they averaged almost twenty-eight miles per gallon. 36 This
means that far fewer barrels of oil are being used for each mile driven
and far fewer pollutants are being pumped into the air than there would
be in the absence of the law.37 This in turn means there is less pollution
and comparatively less need for oil imports from abroad.38 In addition,

32. See Alex Taylor, Do You Know Where Your Car Was Made?, FORTUNE, June 17,
1991, at 52.
33. See Warren Brown, Ford to Convert Two Cars into Imports, WASH. POST, June 20,
1989, at DI (paraphrasing Ford's manager of fuel economy and compliance: "Shifting those
cars from domestic to import slots would help the company improve the CAFE rating of its
domestic fleets by nearly one mile per gallon, while reducing the rating of its import fleet.");
David Everett, Fuel Law Backfires; It Cuts Jobs, Mileage, DET. FREE PRESS, Sept. 30, 1991,
at IA, 7A.
34. Lindsay Chappell, Sentra Open for U.S. Bids, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Sept. 19, 1994, at 1.

35. Peter Passell, Were the Government's Mileage Standardsfor Cars a Mistake?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1995, at C2.
36. Id.
37. Other standards require cleaner cars. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 7401-7671 (1994).
38. Oil is the single largest good imported into the United States in terms of cost. THE
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 202 (Robert Famighetti ed., 1995). The growth in
sales of light trucks, which includes sport utility vehicles, has increased fuel consumption as
this category of vehicles is subject to a lower CAFE standard. Brad Knickerbocker, As
Drivers Shift to Guzzlers, Nation's Fuel Efficiency Stalls, CHRISTIAN SCI. MO NITOR, Oct. 6,
1995, at 1. In light of the growth in sales of light trucks, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration proposed to increase the CAFE standards by 35 percent by 2006. A law was
passed in 1995 that prohibits the Department of Transportation from spending any money on
a rule that would lead to higher CAFE standards for light trucks, effectively scuttling efforts
to increase fuel efficiency. Phil Frame, Big Three Win Battle in CAFE War, AUTOMOTIVE
NEws, Nov. 6, 1995, at 3. Many have argued that the CAFE law has increased fuel consumption by making it cheaper to drive. See, e.g., Passell, supra note 35.
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the CAFE law has produced these benefits at no net cost to consumers.
The cost of the technology to increase fuel economy has been offset by
the savings from purchasing less gasoline.39 Both of these achievements
reflect the primary goals of the CAFE law. 40
B. CAFE, Global Warming, and the Environment
The CAFE law is unusual in that it is domestic law, applied domestically, 4' that has a directly positive effect not only in the United States,
but across all borders. The CAFE law, by reducing the consumption of
gasoline,42 helps to preserve a limited natural resource that is an integral
part of essentially every economy in the world. In reducing gasoline
consumption it reduces auto emissions, which create greenhouse gases,
which in turn cause global warming. Transportation is a particularly
large source of greenhouse gases, as about one-third of all man-made
carbon dioxide emissions from industrial countries come from the
transportation sector.43
Global warming, of course, is an issue that has raised deep concern
internationally and has been a focus of cooperative efforts to protect the
environment."4 The first serious effort to develop an international approach to resolving this problem began in 1991 through the creation of
the Framework Convention on Climate Change. 4' The United States,
members of the European Union, and Japan were among the countries
that participated in the creation of the document. 46 This work produced
an agreement that was signed at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro.
The agreement negotiated in Rio de Janeiro aimed for each nation to

39. Gregg Easterbrook, Here Comes the Sun, NEW YORKER, Apr. 10, 1995, at 38, 40.
But see Passell, supra note 35, at C2 (stating that the CAFE law has cost between 30 and 60
cents for each gallon saved).
40. But see Pietro S. Nivola and Robert W. Crandall, The Extra Mile: Rethinking Energy
Policyfor Automotive Transportation,BROOKINGs REV., Winter 1995, at 30.
41. Cf. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1994)
(designed to apply extraterritorially).
42. See Passell, supra note 35.
43. Reducing Greenhouse Emissions from Transport: A Look at National Plans, Global
Environmental Change Report, Apr. 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
44. See, e.g., Adam A. Aronson, Note, From "Cooperator'sLoss" to Cooperative Gain:
Negotiating Greenhouse Gas Abatement, 102 YALE L.J. 2143, 2144 (1993) (arguing that
despite some scientific uncertainty, global warming presents a serious problem to world
welfare).
45. David G. Victor & Julian E. Salt, From Rio to Berlin: Managing Climate Change,
ENV'T, Dec. 1994, at 6.
46. See Martin J. LaLonde, Note, The Role of Risk Analysis in the 1992 Framework
Convention on Climate Change, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 215, 235 (1992).
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reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. 47
In other words, each nation was to take unilateral measures to address
the problem.48 The "Rio Treaty" called for these plans to be developed
by 1995. 49

Fifteen industrialized countries released their plans to address global
warming at a 1995 conference in Berlin. 50 Nine of the fifteen nations,
including the United States, were unable to detail how they would meet
the goal set out at the Earth Summit.5 ' The inability of many nations to
even develop a plan, much less make difficult and expensive changes in
energy consumption, illustrates the extreme difficulty of meeting this
environmental goal.52 The uncertainty inherent in the problem has made
a number' of nations reluctant to aggressively address the issue. Like
many other environmental policies involving complex scientific analysis
that cannot produce certainty, the desire to combat global warming has
been tempered by a small number of studies that conclude that it may
not be as serious a problem as it once was believed. 53 Tied to the uncertainty is the lack of will to address issues that will have consequences
far into the future. Global warming will begin to have serious effects
late in the next century if adequate steps are not taken.54
Addressing global warming is especially difficult because of collective action problems. The fundamental problem is encouraging cooperation among many participants. When seeking to address a problem such
as global warming, the benefit from taking action may be large but
costly. Since benefits accrue only when many countries act, cooperation
is necessary. Obtaining cooperation is difficult because each individual

47. See, e.g., Elizabeth P. Barratt-Brown et al., A Forum for Action on Global Warming:
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, 4 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
103, 110-11 (1993); Salil P. Patel, Comment, Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions to 1990
Levels By the Year 2000: What are the Options and Can the United States Achieve this
Reduction Without Disrupting the Economy?, 3 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 79 (1992).

48. The agreement does allow for nations to work together to reduce emissions. BarrattBrown, supra note 47, at 111. At this point, however, joint efforts appear to be rare.
49. William K. Stevens, Nations to Consider Toughening Curbs on Global Warming,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1995, at B8.
50. Id.
51. Id.

52. In an effort to implement policies that would meet the goals of the Earth Summit, the
Clinton Administration created an advisory panel that included federal and state government
officials, as well as industry and environmental representatives, to find acceptable policies to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from cars. Increasing the CAFE standards was among the
issues before the panel. Without reaching agreement on any issue, the panel disbanded. Jayne
O'Donnell, Auto Future Hits Roadblock: Washington Meetings Devolve into Car Not Talks,
AUTOWEEK, Oct. 2, 1995, at 4, available in LEXIS, News library, Autowk file.

53. Passell, supra note 35.
54. See, e.g., Stevens, supra note 49.
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country may not believe that its participation is necessary and that the
problem can be solved without them. Thus, these countries are unwilling
to incur the cost and will "free-ride" on the efforts of others. This
problem recurs in environmental policy, particularly in issues that cross
national borders or extend into global commons. The international effort
to limit global warming represents a classic case in point. Even though
120 nations agreed to address the problem, there is no guarantee that all
will take the agreed-upon (costly) steps.55 As long as some nations
refuse to honor their obligations, there will be an incentive for more
nations to do less than their share. These nations can allow others to
incur the cost of reducing emissions and reap the benefits for free.
Those countries that do not take measures to reduce the threat of
global warming will obtain a competitive advantage in producing goods
for trade. Producers in nations with lower environmental standards will
have fewer costs as compared to their economic competitors. There is
thus an incentive for each nation to reduce costs incurred by producers
by reducing environmental standards below their competitors' .56 Whether
the GATTIWTO system provides much of an incentive to race-to-thebottom is a hotly contested issue.57 There is no question, however, that
the thrust of the GATT/WTO has been to permit lower environmental
standards as a legitimate form of comparative advantage. 5s It is troubling
that there may still be a race-to-the-bottom when there is a widely
accepted international agreement on an environmental issue, as there is
on global warming.
The CAFE case implicates all of these issues. The elimination of the
CAFE law would make it even more difficult for the United States to
meet its Rio obligations. As the world's largest emitter of man-made
carbon dioxide, it must play a central role in the world's effort to limit

55. See, e.g., Victor and Salt, supra note 45, at 30.
56. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2041 (1994). Consumers state that they are willing to buy environmentally friendly products. See Thomas C. Downs, Note, "Environmentally Friendly"
Product Advertising: Its Future Requires a New Regulatory Authority, 42 AM. U. L. REV.

155, 155 n.2 (1992). However, this market appears to be quite small. "[I]f the coming year
follows recent trends, [the] top 10 [most] fuel-efficient cars will account for less than I
percent of those sold." Knickerbocker, supra note 38, at 5. Even autos made with high fuel

efficiency may be produced in nations with low environmental standards and thus the
production process may add a relatively large amount of pollution.
57. See, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, Reforming U.S. Trade Policy to Protect the Global
Environment: A MultilateralApproach, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 185, 198-99 (1994); John
F. Kerry, Trade and the Environment: Charting a New Course, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 447,
452 (1994).
58. Herman E. Daily, From Adjustment To Sustainable Development: The Obstacle of
Free Trade, 15 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 33, 36-42 (1992).
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global warming. As the recent conference in Berlin demonstrated, the
United States has been unable to develop a strong enough plan to reduce
greenhouse gases - even with the CAFE law already in place. Were
the CAFE law to be repealed, the United States might face insurmountable problems in meeting its obligation. Moreover, beyond concerns
about the United States meeting its obligation, setting fuel economy
standards could be a method taken around the world to reduce greenhouse gases.59 Some have suggested creating a protocol that calls on
60
other nations to set fuel economy standards.
II. GATT PANEL DECISION
The EC claimed that the CAFE law violated Article III of GATT,
the national treatment obligation. 6 ' The EC argued that the CAFE law
had had a disproportionate impact on European car makers because of
certain provisions that favor U.S. automakers. These provisions requiring "fleet accounting" and "fleet averaging" - the EC argued,
violated Article III paragraph four, which prohibits measures that treat
62
imported products less favorably than domestic products.
The national treatment obligation is at the very core
of the
GATT/WTO regime. It helps to ensure that laws and regulations do not

59. Reducing Greenhouse Emissions from Transport: A Look at National Plans, supra
note 43.
60. Victor & Salt, supra note 45, at 28.
61. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, paras. 3.220-3.313. Paragraphs two and four of
Article III were at the heart of the challenge. Article III, para. 2, reads as follows:

The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal
taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or
indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party shall otherwise
apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or domestic products in a
manner contrary to the principles set forth in paragraph 1.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. III, para. 2, 61 Stat. All, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [GATT], amended in 62 Stat. 3680, 62 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Dec. 14,
1948).
Article III, para. 4, reads as follows:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use. The provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on
the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the
product.
GATT, supra, art. III, para. 4.
62. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, paras. 3.266, 3.290.
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favor domestic products at the expense of imports. The proper scope of
the national treatment obligation is a matter of debate, however. One
might legitimately ask whether Article III has been interpreted in a way
that effectively requires comparatively more favorable treatment for
foreign products.63 The CAFE panel decision, which is fundamentally
consistent in its reasoning with previous Article III cases, illustrates a
situation in which Article III can be interpreted to provide more favorable treatment for imported products.
A. Origin of the Dispute
After consultations between the EC and the United States failed to
resolve the controversy over the CAFE law and the gas guzzler and
luxury taxes, the EC called for the establishment of a panel under
Article XXIII. 64 Article XXIII allows for the dispute settlement procedure to be invoked if a member of the GATT believes that "any benefit
...under [the] Agreement is being nullified or impaired ....,,6Some
automakers in the EC have incurred penalties for failing to meet the
CAFE requirements. In 1992, at the time the case was brought,
automakers in the EC reportedly had paid over two hundred million
dollars in fines to the U.S. government for CAFE violations. 66 The EC
pointed to the disparate effect of the law. It claimed that 99.99 percent
of the penalties paid under the law had been paid by European producers and that no U.S. company has ever paid any fines for failing to meet
the CAFE standards. 67 In particular, the EC argued that the "fleet accounting" and "fleet averaging" provisions did not comport with the
GATT. Sweden, which exports cars of similar fuel economy to the
United States and at the time was not a member of the European Union,
joined as a third party in claiming that the CAFE law violated the
national treatment obligations of Article III of GATT.

63. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 508-22 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing, without resolving, this issue).
64. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 1.1.
65. GATT,supra note 61, art. XXIII, para. 1. The following paragraph states that "[i]f

no satisfactory adjustment is effected between the contracting parties concerned within a
reasonable time ...the matter may be referred to the CONTRACTING PARTIES. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall promptly investigate any matter so referred to them and shall
make appropriate recommendations to the contracting parties which they consider to be
concerned, or give a ruling on the matter, as appropriate." Id. at para. 2.
66. Paying the Price: Gas Guzzlers Rack up $233 Million in Government Fines, DET.

FREE PRESS, Nov. 11, 1992, at 1E. Mercedes and BMW were the principal violators of the
CAFE law. See, e.g., Kibel, supra note 8, at 16. The Department of Transportation sets the
penalties for violation of the CAFE law. 49 U.S.C. § 32912(b) (1994).
67. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 3.220.
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B. National Treatment

1. Goals
The national treatment obligation requires that "nations, when applying their domestic taxes and regulations, treat imports no less favorably
than they treat their domestically produced goods. 68 The goal is to
protect the importing nation's sovereign right to regulate its market
while at the same time ensuring that domestic law is not used as a nontariff barrier to trade. One of the basic goals of the trading system
created by GATT is to force all trade barriers into the open so nations
can negotiate mutually beneficial reductions. 69 Article III is designed to
70
eliminate non-tariff barriers and to protect the integrity of the tariffs.
Making trade barriers apparent also helps to ensure that the trade system
is fair. Each side knows what the other has given and what it retains.
Non-tariff barriers, or disguised discrimination, undermine the goals
set out by GATT. The number of non-tariff barriers is staggering. Researchers have identified hundreds of non-tariff barriers that nations
have erected; the number of non-tariff barriers that could be conceived
of and implemented is far larger. 7' One example of a disguised trade
barrier arose between the United States and Canada over lobster fishing.
"[T]he U.S. banned imports of Canadian lobsters that did not meet the
minimum size requirements ...

despite evidence that Canadian lobsters

are naturally smaller because Canadian waters are colder., 72 This placed
Canadian fishermen at a disadvantage, and the issue was heard under the
dispute settlement procedure set up as part of the Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement. 73 Designing trade rules that eliminate these hidden
barriers while ensuring that a nation may pass laws to address its needs
has proven difficult. Often, there is a tension between non-discrimination and enabling a nation to have flexibility in designing a law to
address its problems. This tension is at the core of the controversy over
the CAFE law.

68. John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or
Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1232 (1992).
69. Id. If the GATT is evaluated on how dramatically tariff barriers have fallen, it has
been an enormous success. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 117 (1989).
70. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 5.53; JACKSON, supra note 69, at 189.
71. See JACKSON, supra note 69, at 130.
72. Stewart, supra note 56, at 2043.
73. Lobsters from Canada, 1990 WL 299945 (U.S.-Can. Free Trade Agreement Binational Panel, May 25, 1990).
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2. Article III:4
The EC's challenge to the CAFE law was based on Article III
Paragraph four (Article 111:4) which states that imported products "shall
be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like
products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale . . . .,,7"The entire CAFE law
was not challenged by the EC; the EC stated that it favored the environmental goals of the law.75 Instead, it challenged two specific provisions.
First, it claimed that the separate fleet accounting provision violated
Article 111:4. The separate foreign fleet accounting provision violated
GATT, the EC argued, because it afforded protection to small domestic
cars 76 and treated large imported cars less favorably than large domestic
cars, because importers could not combine large imported cars with
small domestic cars." The United States argued that domestic products
were also discriminated against because U.S. firms could not combine
large domestic cars with small foreign cars to meet the requirement.78
Second, the EC argued that the fleet averaging provision violated Article
III because it treated like products differently. 79 The EC claimed that the
fact that U.S. automakers could increase the average fuel economy of
the fleet by adding sales of small domestically produced cars, while
"limited-line" European producers could not because they do not produce small cars, indicated that the law violated Article III, because it allowed like products to be treated differently depending on the company
that manufactured them.80
3. Panel's Findings on Article III Claims
a. Fleet Accounting Provision
The panel found that the requirement calling for separation of an
automaker's cars into a foreign fleet and domestic fleet violated Article
III because it treated both small foreign cars less favorably than small
domestic cars and large foreign cars less favorably than large domestic

74. GATT,supra note 61, art. III, para. 4.
75. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5,para. 3.314.

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. para. 3.290.
See id. para. 5.47.
Id para. 3.298.
Id. para. 3.269.

80. Id.
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cars."' Small foreign cars were treated less favorably because, unlike
small domestic cars, they could not be used to offset the low fuel efficiency of large domestic cars. Likewise, large foreign cars were treated
less favorably because unlike large domestic cars they could not have
their poor fuel efficiency offset by small domestic cars.82
The reasoning of the panel was consistent with previous GATT
interpretation of Article 11I:4 on this issue. Although there is no rule of
stare decisis under the GATT and previous cases do not bind later
GATT panels, panels have relied on the reasoning of past panels.83 Here,
the panel decision United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930 4 is relevant. The panel held in the Section 337 dispute that less
favorable treatment in one part of a law cannot be balanced against
more favorable treatment in another part of the law.85 Even though the
CAFE law provides foreign producers more favorable treatment than
domestic producers in practice - because large foreign cars can be
averaged with small foreign cars while large domestic cars cannot be
averaged with small foreign cars - the GATT makes no attempt at
determining the net effect of the entire statutory scheme.
Balancing the provisions that favor domestic products against provisions that favor imported products would be inconsistent with the
GATT's interest in protecting the expectations of the parties, according
to the Section 337 panel. The panel reasoned that balancing would lead
to uncertainty because it might result in situations in which a panel
might allow less favorable treatment in one case and more favorable
treatment in another. 86 This analysis has another consequence: in protecting certainty a panel seeks to evaluate laws prospectively. Thus, a com-

81. Id. para. 5.47.
82. Id. para. 5.48.
83. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Strengthening the GATT Dispute Settlement System: On
the Use of Arbitration in GAT, in THE NEW GATT ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 323, 335 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann &

Meinhard Hilf eds., 2d ed. 1991) ("Even though GATT panels and the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES remain free to deviate from GATT interpretations applied in previously
adopted panel reports, they have hardly ever done so."); Jackson, supra note 68, at 1253-54.
But see Meinhard Hilf, Settlement of Disputes in International Economic Organizations:
Comparative Analysis and Proposalsfor Strengthening the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures, in THE NEw GA17 ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, supra, at 300 ("For the time being it seems unlikely that the GATT
[dispute settlement] procedures can generate a reliable and law-creating case law.").
84. United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, GATT"Doc. L6439 (Nov. 7,
1989) [hereinafter Section 337 Panel Report], compiled in GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS
AND TRADE: BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [hereinafter BISD] 36th Supp.
345 (1990).
85. Id. paras. 5.11-14.
86. Id. para. 5.14.
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plaining party need not demonstrate a negative impact,87 it need only
demonstrate that a law conflicts with the GATT. In the CAFE case,
even though the EC presented facts that showed that EC automakers had
been fined far more than U.S. automakers, it did not need to show how
the penalties affected actual trade."
b. Fleet Averaging Provision
The panel also found the fleet averaging rule to violate Article III
because like products were not treated equally. The CAFE statute calls
for an averaging of fuel efficiency over all of a manufacturer's auto
sales in the United States. Large cars are averaged with small and medium-sized cars. This results in situations in which similar cars can be
treated differently. The EC had argued, for example, that the MercedesBenz 500 SL was similar, with respect to fuel efficiency, to the Cadillac
Allante, but because of the fleet averaging rules, the Mercedes was
penalized, while the Cadillac was not.89 The fact that a product was
treated differently on the basis of something not related to the product
as a product violated Article 111.90 In this example, General Motors'
sales of more fuel efficient cars prevented it from incu'rring a penalty,
while the similarly situated foreign car producer was penalized. This
disparate treatment of like products violated GATT. The panel stated
that "to the extent that treatment under the CAFE measure was based on
factors relating to the control or ownership of producers/importers, it
could not in accordance with Article 111:4 be applied in a manner that
also accorded less favorable treatment to products of foreign origin."'"
The "less favorable treatment" in itself was sufficient to constitute a
violation of GATT; the panel did not find it necessary to determine
whether the law had the effect "so as to afford protection" to domestic
producers. 92
4. Scope of the Panel's Reasoning

-

More Favorable Treatment

The CAFE decision provides support to the argument that in seeking
to prevent discrimination between imported and domestic goods, Article

87. JACKSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 519.
88. A strong argument could be made that U.S. companies would be more profitable if
they did not have to comply with the CAFE law. See discussion supra part I.A.2.a. Thus, the
net effect of the CAFE law on trade may actually favor foreign producers.
89. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 3.271.
90. Id. para. 5.55.
91. Id para. 5.54.
92. Id.
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III can require comparatively more favorable treatment for imports. One
clearly needs more than formal legal equality to meet the requirements
of Article III. A statute that does not explicitly discriminate against
imports can violate Article 11I. 93 In order to eliminate disguised discrimination, Article III would have to reach beyond facially discriminatory
laws. As in the Canadian Lobster case discussed earlier,94 nations might
design laws in a way to unfairly exclude foreign goods. Difficulty arises
when differences in the markets of foreign and domestic companies
cause facially neutral laws to have different effects even when a nation
does not try to discriminate.
Different approaches taken by EC and U.S. automakers were at the
heart of the dispute. A major argument made by the United States was
that the EC automakers were penalized under the CAFE law not because
the law intended to discriminate against them, but because the companies made a business decision to accept the penalties rather than improve fuel efficiency. Indeed, at the time the CAFE law was enacted,
Mercedes and BMW, the companies that supported the complaint, met
the CAFE standards. The United States argued that to accept the EC's
complaint would essentially require the United States to alter the rules
specifically for the EC's benefit. The result would be that EC producers
would be given favorable treatment.
The United States pointed out that the EC automakers that had been
fined had actually lowered the fuel economy of the cars they sold in the
United States during the 1980s. 96 It was not that the standard was too
high for the Europeans to meet, it was that they had decided that they
would make a greater profit with other designs. The EC responded by
stating that European companies were "limited-line" manufacturers, that
is, they only produced large cars. Because they were "limited-line"
manufacturers they were fundamentally different from U.S. companies,
which produced a "full-line" of auto products.97 The panel's rejection of
the United States' argument suggests effective advocacy by the EC.
There is nothing inherent in an auto company that makes one "limitedline" and another "full-line." The composition of the cars made and sold
reflects both an evaluation of the market and legal rules, such as the
CAFE law. U.S. companies undoubtedly would manufacture fewer small
cars in the United States - and become more like "limited-line" manu-

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Section 337 Panel Report, supra note 84.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 3.243.
Id. para. 3.243.
See id. para. 3.269.
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facturers - if the CAFE law were repealed. After all, as noted, U.S.
companies have sold some small cars at a loss in order to meet the
CAFE requirements.98 In short, were the panel report to be adopted, the
EC producers would be given more favorable treatment because they do
not choose to sell small cars as the U.S. companies do.
The United States' business decision argument, while it shows how
the effect of a decision may be to give foreign producers an advantage, 99
ultimately failed. First, the United States could not find an adequate
basis for the argument in the GATT rules. The support it offered was
off-point. The United States pointed to a statement made by the panel in
United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages"ro
that "'[tihe Article 111:4 requirement was one addressed to relative competitive opportunities created by the government in the market, not the
actual choices made by enterprises in that market."" 0 ' By quoting that
excerpt in this context, the United States subtly misstated what the panel
meant. In the Malt Beverages case, the panel was concerned about
opportunities in the market, not about the decisions made by businesses.
Unlike the CAFE case, the law at issue there was facially discriminatory. Some importers made a business decision that made the effect of the
law non-discriminatory. In finding the law to conflict with the GATT,
the panel at least implicitly ignored the business decisions of the importers.
Second, and more fundamentally, if the argument were accepted, it
would constrain foreign producers much more than the GATT envisioned. Unless a law explicitly stated that imports were to be treated less
favorably than domestic products, a nation could in every case defend a
discriminatory law by claiming that the foreign producer did not comply
simply because it had made faulty business decisions. There would be
no way to contain the argument. Furthermore, it would strike at the
heart of the premise underlying the world trading system - that we
should maximize the value of comparative advantage. 1t 2 Under this
theory, businesses around the world should be given wide latitude in
developing and producing goods so that they can emphasize the things
they do most efficiently. Were the GATT to uphold discriminatory laws

98. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
99. The argument is also appealing given the decision of some European automakers to
reduce fuel economy instead of improve it.
100. United States - Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GATT Dec.
DS23/R, (June 19, 1992), compiled in BISD, supra note 84, 39th Supp. 206 (1990).
101. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 3.233.

102. See JACKSON, supra note 69, at 10-14.
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on the basis of a "business decision" argument, nations would have to
alter their own behavior more than the GATT requires. Too much
oversight over a company's business decisions could eviscerate comparative advantage and undermine the gains of trade.
The most convincing argument that Article III can require comparatively more favorable treatment for imported products arises from the
narrow reasoning of the panel. The panel refused to balance less favorable treatment for imports against the less favorable treatment accorded
domestic products. 10 3 Requiring imports to be treated at least as favorably as domestic products, but ignoring the less favorable treatment that
domestic products may receive, puts domestic products at a disadvantage. In other words, if foreign products can at worst be treated as well
as domestic products, but at the same time domestic products can be
treated worse than foreign products, domestic products can be comparably worse-off than imported products. The CAFE case illustrates this
phenomenon. The panel concluded that the fleet accounting provision
violated Article III because large imported cars could not be averaged
with small domestic cars. 4 At the same time, the CAFE law placed
U.S. automakers at a disadvantage because large domestic cars could not
be averaged with small imported cars. However, the panel only found
the former to be in violation of the GATT; there is no requirement that
the United States remedy the damage its own automakers suffer.
One might respond that Article III does not require comparatively
more favorable treatment because a nation can amend its law to ensure
that domestic producers are not disadvantaged. In theory, and often in
practice, a nation will be able to reform its law to ensure that its own
producers are treated as well as foreign producers. Here, the United
States could amend the CAFE law to allow large domestic cars to be
averaged with small foreign cars. But as is argued in Part III of this
Note, this is not realistic, both in light of the goals of the law and
political considerations. In order to gain fuel efficiency, the CAFE law
damaged the competitiveness of U.S. companies. The provisions that
were found to violate the GATT were meant to soften the blow which
the United States imposed on its own producers. Even with the separate
fleet accounting provision, U.S. industry would be damaged. 0 5 Without
the ability to balance less favorable provisions with more favorable
103. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 5.48.
104. Id. paras. 5.47-49.
105. Even the principal Senate supporter of the CAFE provisions in 1975, Senator
Hollings, acknowledged, at least implicitly, that it would reduce the profitability of U.S. auto
companies. See 121 CONG. REc. S22855 (daily ed. July 15, 1975) (statement of Sen. Ernest
F. Hollings).
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provisions, it is doubtful that the law would have been approved. One
sees here that the effort to address environmental concerns directly
clashes with trade concerns.' °'
C. General Exception - Article XX(g)
Although the panel concluded that the fleet averaging provision
violated Article III, the panel strongly suggested that under the proper
circumstances, the fleet averaging provision could be saved by Article
XX(g).' 0 7 This represents an important step in the evolution of Article
XX(g). No panel had found that the exceptions applicable to environmental laws under either Article XX(b) or Article XX(g) had applied. °8
In part, as a consequence of the narrow interpretation of these exceptions, some environmentalists have criticized them for being ineffective.' 09
Article XX provides a series of exceptions to GATT obligations.
The exceptions that the United States claimed applied in this case were
Articles XX(b) and XX(g). Article XX(b) allows for measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health"" 0 to stand under
certain circumstances even though they may violate other GATT obligations. Article XX(g) provides an exception for measures "relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption[.]""'
These exceptions are modified somewhat by the language in the
preamble to Article XX that states that the exceptions are "[s]ubject to
the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which
106. For a proposal to prevent some conflicts between trade and the environment, see
discussion infra part IV.
107. The panel did not indicate what a GATT-consistent law using fleet averaging would
look like.
108. "There have been seven GATT [decisions] where Article XX(b) and (g) exceptions
have been raised; none of them have been successful." William J. Snape, III & Naomi B.
Lefkowitz, Searchingfor GAiT's Environmental Miranda: Are "Process Standards" Getting
"Due Process?," 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 777, 797 n.124 (1994). See, e.g., Report of the
GATT Panel, Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes,
GATT Doc. DS10/R (Nov. 7, 1990); Report of the GATT Panel, Canada - Restrictions on
Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon From the United States, GATT Doc. [U6268
(Mar. 22, 1988); Report of the GATT Panel, United States - Prohibiting of Imports of Tuna
and Tuna Products from Canada, GATT Doc. U5198 (Feb. 22, 1982).
109. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GAT, the JCJ & Trade Environmental
Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1043, 1064-66 (1994). Dunoff also notes that the EC parliament approved a two year moratorium on GATT panel environmental decisions. This action
was taken after the CAFE dispute was submitted to the panel.
110. GATT, supra note 61, art. XX(b).
111. Id. art. XX(g).
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would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade[.]" ' 1 2 This language has been described
as a "soft" most favored nation clause and national treatment obligation." 3 In other words, a measure properly falling under Article XX
would have to meet some most favored nation and national treatment
standard, but not as high a standard as a measure falling outside Article
XX. In a case involving Article XX(g), a GATT panel stated that this
language is necessary because "the purpose of including Article XX(g)
in the General Agreement was not to widen the scope for measures
serving trade policy purposes btit merely to ensure that the commitments
under the General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of policies aimed
' 4
at the conservation of exhaustive [sic] natural resources.""
The panel applied a three step approach to the provisions that violated Article III: first, whether the policy of the measure was one to conserve exhaustible natural resources; second, whether the measure "'related to' the conservation of exhaustible natural resources and was one to
conserve exhaustible natural resources and whether it was made effective 'in conjunction' with restrictions on domestic production or consumption"; and third, whether the measure conformed with the soft
MFN and national treatment obligations of the introductory paragraph of
Article XX." 5
1. Fleet Accounting Provision Under Article XX(g)
The panel found rather conclusively that the separate foreign fleet
accounting provision could not be justified under Article XX(g). First,
the panel decided that the United States had offered no evidence that the
provision prohibiting the averaging of large foreign cars with small cars
produced in the United States by the foreign owner' 6 enhanced the
goals permitted under Article XX(g). The less favorable treatment of
large imported cars did not pass muster because that treatment was not
primarily aimed at the conservation of natural resources." 7 Second, the

112. Id. Preamble to Article XX.
113. See JACKSON, supra note 69, at 207.

114. Report of the GATT Panel, Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed
Herring and Salmon, GATT Doc. IJ6268 para. 4.6 (Mar. 22, 1988), compiled in BISD, supra
note 84, 35th Supp. 98, 114 (1989).
115. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 5.56.
116. At present no cars produced in the United States by a manufacturer owned or
controlled by companies based in the EC would meet the domestic content requirements. See
Paul, supra note 18.
117. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 5.61.
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panel ruled Article XX(g) inapplicable because the fleet accounting
provision inhibited the import of small cars." 8 This, of course, was one
of the goals of the law. The panel concluded that this provision was not
"primarily aimed" at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources,
but rather made it more difficult to conserve exhaustible natural resources." 9 By inhibiting the import of small, more fuel efficient cars, the fleet
accounting provision reduced the number of fuel efficient cars sold in
the United States and consequently increased the consumption of oil.
2. Fleet Averaging Provision Under Article XX(g)
The panel noted that under Article XX(g), the fleet averaging provision wouldn't have to be necessary to conserve an exhaustible natural
resource; that even if "other less trade restrictive measures ... could be
used equally and more effectively,"'' 20 the measure may still pass muster
under GATT. First, the panel found that the policy underlying the CAFE
law was designed to conserve a natural resource. Second, and more
significantly, the panel found that the specific measure - the fleet
averaging provision - could meet the second part of the test under
Article XX(g).1'2 The fleet averaging served to ensure that the law
would meet its goal of conserving exhaustible resources. Without this
provision, there would be no way to ensure that the fuel economy
standards would be met. 22 There would be no way under the law to
ensure that large foreign cars did not lower overall fuel efficiency in the
United States. However, the panel did not find the specific measure as it
is constructed in the CAFE law to meet the requirements under Article
XX(g) because it is intertwined with the fleet accounting provisions,
which could not be justified under Article XX(g). 123 Because the provision as structured did not pass the second test, it did not examine it
under the third step (the soft MFN and national treatment). Thus, although the panel found that the fleet averaging provision in the CAFE
could not be saved by Article XX(g), it opened the possibility that a
CAFE law with a fleet averaging provision would be permitted under
Article XX(g).

118. Id. para. 5.60.

119. Id.
120. Id. para. 5.63. The panel contrasted this with the exceptions under Articles XX(a)
and XX(b) which do require a measure to be necessary. Id.

121. Id. para. 5.66.
122. Id. para. 5.65.
123. Id.
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D. Summary of the Panel Report
In summary, although the CAFE rules as such were not found to
violate GATT, two aspects of the statutory structure were found to violate
the national treatment obligations of GATT. Both the rule calling for the
CAFE averages to be determined by first separating cars produced outside
the United States from cars produced inside the United States, and the rule
requiring these separate categories to be averaged violated Article III of
GATT. As applied in this case, Article III may require imported products
to receive more favorable treatment than domestic products.
Neither of the provisions could be saved by the exception under
Article XX(g) allowing for certain laws that were designed to conserve
exhaustible natural resources. Nonetheless, the panel strongly suggested
that a law with a fleet averaging provision would be permitted under
Article XX(g). If so, it would represent a breakthrough in the application of that exception. At present, no measure has been saved by the
Article XX(g) exception.
III. IMPLICATIONS AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES
OF THE DECISION

A. Status of the Panel Report
The panel decision recommended that the provisions of the CAFE
law that did not comply with GATT be brought into conformity. Under
most circumstances, the United States would have to revise the law,
negotiate with the EU for compensation, or allow the EU to suspend
concessions in a way that harms the United States. 124 However, the
panel report has not been adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to
the GATT. 25 Adoption of a panel report prior to the Uruguay Round
and the creation of the WTO required a consensus of all parties.' 26 This
meant that any one party -

even the losing party -

could ensure that

the panel report would not be adopted.
The results in this case - including the sections on the luxury tax
and the gas guzzler law - have produced an odd dynamic. The United

124. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, in
Uruguay Round Trade Agreements, Texts of Agreements Implementing Bill, Statement of
AdministrativeAction, and Required Supporting Statements, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. 655-56 (1994).
125. In GATT style, "contracting parties" is capitalized when referring to the members of
GATT when they are acting jointly under Article XXV. GATT, supra note 61, art. II, para. 6.
126. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
supra note 124, at 656.
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States, the subject of the complaint and a losing party on one part of the
case, favored the report's adoption, while the EU has opposed its adoption.127 The United States was pleased that the luxury tax and the gas
guzzler laws were found to comport with GATT and it has declared
victory as to the CAFE part of the case, even though the law was found
to violate the GATT. 128 Although the EU prevailed with regard to the
CAFE law, its complaint was rejected with regard to the luxury tax and
the gas guzzler tax. The EU rejected the panel report as it believes that
the panel members misread its legal brief. 129 The EU asked the WTO
Council to review the matter. Sweden, which acted as a third party, also
called for the issues to be examined again. 3 ' At this point, the GATT
Council has not taken action in response to those requests.
There are a number of possible future developments in this case. It
might remain dormant and the panel report may never be adopted.
Given the United States' position on the case, the United States is
unlikely to negotiate an agreement with the EU on the CAFE law. The
WTO Council could agree with the EU's argument and reopen the case.
No rule in the GATT would prohibit this. The principle of res judicata
has been rejected in the past by the GATT Council; panels have been
established that have examined the same law prior panels had addressed. 13' If the case were to be reopened it is likely that the GATT

127. GATT Votes WTO into Existence, Dispute Over. Extension Resolved, [Jul.-Dec.]

Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1925-26 (Dec. 14, 1994).
128. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. For examples in which U.S. officials have
claimed victory on the CAFE part of the case, see GATT Implementing Legislation, 1994:
Hearings on S.2467 Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d

Cong., 2d Sess. 213-14 (1994) (statement of Daniel Brinza, Senior Advisor and Special
Counsel for Natural Resources, Office of the United States Trade Representative) (The CAFE
panel report "demonstrates that WTO panels will not interpret the GATT in a way that
undermines our ability to safeguard our environment."); EU Fails to Persuade GAiT Panel
on U.S. Fuel Conservation Law, Auto Tax, [July-Dec.] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at
1532 (Oct. 5, 1994); GAT Panel Rejects Key EU Challenges to U.S. Fuel Conservation
Measures, supra note 6; GATT Ruling Upholds U.S. Fuel Efficiency Standards, Clean Air

Network Online Today, Oct. 3, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nwltrs File; Behr,
supra note 7, at DI.
129. After Free Trade Euphoria,Now Comes the Hard Part,[Jan.-June] Int'l Trade Rep.

(BNA) No. 3, at 129 (Jan. 18, 1995). The panel's reasoning and conclusion with regard to the
luxury tax part of the case in particular has drawn sharp criticism from the EC.
130. European Union Disputes Panel's Upholding U.S. in GAT Challenge, Energy
Report, Nov. 14, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.

131. In 1991, the GATT Council established a panel to hear a second claim by Brazil
against a U.S. law affecting the import of non-rubber footwear. A GATT panel had rejected
Brazil's argument that the law violated the 1979 Subsidies Code. Brazil had asked that it be
given a second chance to challenge the law, this time as a violation of Article I of the GATT.
ROBERT E. HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE EVOLUTION OF THE

MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 249 (1993). The United States argued against the establishment of the second panel, arguing that the first panel report should serve as res judicata. The
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rules on dispute settlement would apply.

32

B. Potential Consequences of the Report
At this point, the United States need not conform the CAFE law to
GATT because of the panel decision. The panel report has not been
adopted; and even if it were, the United States is not compelled under
the GATT or the WTO to amend its law. 133 And, indeed, the Clinton
Administration has stated that it will not amend the law to conform with
its GATT obligations. 34 There is no indication that Congress will amend
the law to comply with the panel report. 35 The panel decision would
carry no weight in a domestic proceeding
and thus a U.S. court cannot
36
compel the law to be changed.
Yet whether or not the case will be reopened, examining how the
CAFE law would likely appear if it were to conform to the GATT is
useful because it demonstrates how our obligations under the
137
GATT/WTO system affect our ability to enact environmental law.

panel was established in spite of this argument. GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO
GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 704 (6th ed. 1994). Likewise, Ambassador Kantor vowed to seek
a full review by the GATT Council of the Tuna II report or ask for reconsideration of the
case by the panel. GATT U.S. Seeks Review of Tuna-Dolphin Decision; Ruling Said to
Undermine Environment Laws, BNA Int'l Env't Daily, May 25, 1994, available in LEXIS,
Envirn Library, Bnaied File. Cf.Report of the GATT Panel, EEC - Restrictions on Imports

of Dessert Apples - Complaint by Chile, GATT Doc. No. U.5047 (June 22, 1989), compiled
in BISD, supra note 84, 36th Supp. 93.
132. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding states that disputes arising under the
GATT must follow the past rules and procedures. This applies even to panel reports that have
not been adopted. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing The Settlement of
Disputes, supra note 124, at 656.
133. See generally JACKSON ET AL., supra note 63, at 318-48.
134. See, e.g., Recent Developments: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, [1994]
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 10753 (Dec. 1994).
135. As of November 2, 1995, 3,971 bills have been introduced in the current session of
Congress - none of them would amend the CAFE law to conform with the panel report.
141 CONG. REC. D1298, D1301 (daily ed., Nov. 2, 1995). See O'Donnell, supra note 52
(noting failure of efforts to reach common ground on policies to reduce greenhouse gases
from autos).
136. It is important to note that even though the panel found that the CAFE law violates
the United States' GATT/WTO obligations, and the WTO has force as U.S. law, this conflict
does not make the CAFE law invalid. In the event that GA'IWTO rules conflict with a U.S.
law, U.S. courts have ruled that U.S. law applies. See, e.g., Suramerica de Aleaciones
Laminadas, C.A. v. United States, 966 F.2d 660, 667-68 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Provisions of the
CAFE law clearly conflict with GATT rules and there is no plausible way to read them as
being consistent with the United States' obligation under GAIT. Under the reasoning of U.S.
courts, however, there is no question that the CAFE law would prevail in a challenge in the
United States on the basis of GATT. In short, the U.S. courts, whose decision would be
binding, cannot be used to invalidate the CAFE law.
137. One should remember that neither of the Tuna-Dolphin reports was adopted and the
United States has not changed the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the law at issue there.
Those panel reports clearly were important.
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When one examines what a CAFE law that conformed with the GATT
would look like, one concludes that Ambassador Kantor's statement that
the panel decision "laid to rest fears that WTO panels will interpret the
GATT in a way that challenged [sic] our ability to safeguard our environment"' 138 cannot withstand scrutiny. In short, the panel decision does
limit our ability to safeguard our environment. Examining what would
need to be done to make the CAFE law compatible with the GATT
makes this point clearer.
C. Bringing U.S. Law into Compliance With the GATT
1. A CAFE Law that Would Conform With the GATT
This section sets forth an amendment to the CAFE law that would
conform with the requirements of the GATT. In light of the reluctance
in the United States to alter the CAFE law, the amendment would alter
the CAFE law as little as possible. The amendment would eliminate the
separate fleet accounting provision, but retain the fleet averaging provision.
The separate fleet accounting for foreign and domestic autos cannot
survive GATT in any form. The panel found that it was discriminatory
because like products - small cars, for example - were treated differently on criteria unrelated to "cars as products."' 139 In this case, treating
the products differently because the manufacturers were different was
unacceptable. There is no plausible way to define imported cars as
different "products" from domestically produced cars under GATT rules.
A revised CAFE law would have to classify imported small cars in the
same way as domestically produced small cars. Likewise, large imported
cars would have to be classified in the same way as large domestic cars.
Separating them on the basis of the place of manufacture is impermissible.
Even though the panel found that the fleet averaging provision
violated Article III, it is possible to retain a fleet averaging provision in
a corporate average fuel economy law. The panel suggested that such a
provision could be saved by Article XX(g).' 4° Thus, the amended law

138. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

139. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 5.55.
140. Id. para. 5.66. The panel did not state how it could be saved by Article XX(g):

This analysis suggested to the Panel that in the absence of separate foreign fleet
accounting it would be possible to include in a revised CAFE regulation an averaging method that would render the CAFE regulation consistent with the General
Agreement. As such a revised method was only hypothetical at this time (since
fleet averaging did not exist independently of separate foreign fleet accounting),

Spring 19961

World Trade and the Environment: The CAFE Case

would retain a fleet averaging provision. As a result, all of the cars sold
by the manufacturer, whether they were produced in the United States or
abroad, would be placed into one category to determine corporate average fuel economy. 4'
2. Likely Effect of a. Revised CAFE Law
Even though only a small part of the statute would be eliminated to
conform with the GATT, a revised CAFE law would be far different
from the current law. Domestic automakers would be more likely to
import small fuel efficient cars and sell them in the United States;
United States manufacturers would probably import more cars they produce abroad and enter into more joint ventures with foreign companies.42 In the absence of an increase in the CAFE minimum, U.S.
automakers could meet the requirement by selling in the United States
more small cars produced abroad. 43 This would likely be the choice
given the large expense of developing new technology. As a result of
this change in the market, the incentive to develop energy efficient
technology would be undermined. To the extent that producing small
cars is more expensive in the United States, that production would be
eliminated and the goal of encouraging greater small car production in
the United States would also be undermined. 44 The market would likely
produce U.S. auto companies that, in terms of domestic production,

and since the CAFE regulation would in the view of the Panel require substantial
change if separate foreign fleet accounting were removed, the Panel did not consid-

er that it could or should make a finding on the consistency of a revised regulation.

Id.
141. The statutory language would look like this:
(a)

Method of calculation.-(1) the Administrator of the Environmen-

tal Protection Agency shall calculate the average fuel economy of a
manufacturer subject to section 32902(a) of this title [relating to
passenger cars] in a way prescribed by the Administrator by dividing (A) the number of passenger automobiles manufactured by the
manufacturer in a model year; by
(B) the sum of the fractions obtained by dividing the number of
passenger automobiles of each model manufactured by the
manufacturer in that model year by the fuel economy measured for that model.
142. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
143. Because U.S. automakers lose money overall on sales of small cars, they might
resell cars made abroad under U.S. nameplates in order to meet the CAFE law if the fleet
accounting provision were removed. See id. and accompanying text.
144. This, of course, is what the GATT intends: to remove barriers that provide artificial
advantages to domestic producers.
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would more closely resemble limited-line European automakers. Because
of the potential for lost manufacturing of small cars, it is unlikely that a
revised CAFE law would garner much political support from many of
those who have supported the law in the past.
The amended law would give EU automakers no new way to meet
the CAFE requirements, unless they plan on purchasing small U.S.-built
cars and reselling them in the United States. That is not likely. A revision that retains the fleet averaging provision does not leave the EU
producers who pay the penalties in a better position. In fact, inasmuch
as U.S. automakers can more cheaply meet the requirements under the
revised law, EU manufacturers may be worse off in comparison to U.S.
producers. In the absence of the CAFE law, U.S. automakers would
likely put more resources into the development of larger cars which
14 5
compete directly with the EU automakers who raised the Complaint.
In challenging the CAFE law before the panel, perhaps the EC
hoped for one of three things to happen. The first would be that revision
of the law would be impossible, and that the CAFE law would be
eliminated entirely. The second would be that U.S. companies would be
forced to build more small cars in their plants in Europe. 46 This is
suggested by the fact that the "limited-line" manufacturers in Europe
would at best be no better off under a CAFE law that conforms to
GATT. Since U.S. automakers already produce a great number of small
cars in Europe, economies of scale might make it cheaper for them to
meet new CAFE requirements by importing small cars from their European plants. The third possibility is that the EC hoped that the panel
would accept their argument that the combined effect of the CAFE law,
the luxury tax and the gas guzzler tax violated the GATT. In other
words, including the challenge to the CAFE law would bolster their
arguments with regard to the other laws, which penalize
European
4
producers much more severely than the CAFE law does. ' 1
D. A "'Wrong' Case?"
The consequence of eliminating the one "technical" element of the
law to ensure that the CAFE law comported with Article III would
require a "substantial change" in the law, as the panel noted. 48 If

145. The profit margin is higher for large cars than it is for small cars. See, e.g., America's Carmakers: An Exhausting Time, supra note 25, at 76.
146. The EC pointed out in its presentation to the panel that the U.S. "already produces
quality small cars in Europe." CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, para. 3.290.
147. Cf.id. para. 3.345.
148. Id. para. 5.66.
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amending the CAFE law to comply with GATT would cause a fundamental change in the effect of the law, one wonders whether it would
survive in any recognizable form. This may be an example of what
Professor Robert E. Hudec calls a "'wrong' case.' ' 149 These are cases in
which "the complaining party may be correct in alleging a violation, but
because of domestic political considerations the violator may not be in a
position to comply with GATT rules."'-'
The amended law raises both political problems and substantive
problems. The circumstances that conspired to enable the CAFE law to
prevail have long since ceased to exist. The CAFE law was fundamentally a product of the energy crisis.' 5' The CAFE law was approved at a
time in which there was widespread and deep concern about energy use.
Today, the energy crisis is seen by most - inappropriately - as a thing
of the past. The concern for global warming might offer a foundation for
support of the law, but many believe that the uncertain threat of global
warming does not justify costly environmental measures. 152 The political
dynamics have also changed dramatically. While neither political party
uniformly supported or opposed the CAFE law, supporters of the law in
1975, when it was first enacted, and in 1990, when the Senate voted on
amendments to strengthen the law, were disproportionately members of
the Democratic party. 53 The composition of Congress has changed
dramatically - the law was approved by a very heavily Democratic
Congress that was elected in the wake of Watergate. Today, of course,
the Congress is controlled by the Republican Party. Beyond these changes

149. PIERRE PESCATORE ET AL., 1 HANDBOOK OF GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 76
(1991).
150. Id.
151. Passell, supra note 35, at C2. As an illustration of the perceived severity of the
energy crisis, President Carter stated that it was the "moral equivalent of war." Some scoff at
that bit of hyperbole now. See Kevin Phillips, Clinton's Costly Miscalculations on Health
Care, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 3, 1994, at 15A (calling President Carter's statement a "major
strategic miscalculation.") However, at the time there was great concern about our energy
usage. See 121 CONG. REC. S22312 (daily ed. July 11, 1975). (Statement of Sen. Mike
Mansfield); Ford Statement, supra note 11, at 173.
152. Cf.139 CONG. REc. S258 (daily ed. Apr. 30, 1993) (Statement of Sen. Christopher
S. Bond). In the 1990s, an amendment to increase the CAFE requirements was rejected even
though the sponsor touted the importance vis-a-vis global warming. See Fuel Efficiency Effort
Defeated in Senate, 46 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 279, 280 (1991).
153. The original CAFE law was approved with approximately 80% of Congressional
Democrats supporting it and approximately 25% of the Republicans supporting it. 31 CONG.
Q. ALMANAC 176-H, 90-S (1976). The last time the issue was voted on in the Senate was in
1990 when Senator Richard H. Bryan proposed increasing the CAFE minimums. In a vote to
end a filibuster, 75% of Senate Democrats supported the CAFE bill, while only 33% of the
Republicans supported it. Fuel Efficiency Effort Defeated in Senate, 46 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC
279, 48-S (1991).
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in political control of Congress, the defeat in 1990 of legislation that
would have increased the CAFE requirements indicates that it would be
difficult to enact a new or amended law that strengthens CAFE standards. " It is instructive to note that the 1990 legislation clearly sought
to protect the interests of U.S. companies vis-a-vis competitors from the
Pacific Rim.' 55 The bill called for each producer to increase the fuel
efficiency by a set percentage of their current level. This provides
further evidence that the CAFE approach is only politically viable if the
blow to domestic companies is softened. In any case, given the changes
in the environment in Washington, it would be extremely difficult to
garner sufficient support for an amended CAFE law. Thus, the probable
route the United States would take if the panel report were to be adopted would be to negotiate compensation or face retaliation by the EU.
IV. PROPOSAL: GIVING ARTICLE XX(g) LIFE
A. Need for Change
GATT panels should provide greater leeway to laws that protect the
environment. International efforts to address global warming illustrate
the breadth of support for protecting the environment. Increased wealth
and use of resources, because of the very success of the world trading
system, will also place more strain on our resources. The strong trend
around the world is toward greater environmental protection. As an
institution that will play a central role in determining the quality of life
for people all over the globe, the WTO must allow nations to address
environmental problems.
A variety of proposals have been advanced to enable the
GATT/WTO system to better deal with environmental concerns. Some
have called for the WTO to be amended. For example, it has been
suggested that Article XX be amended to include an explicit exception
for laws that protect the environment. 56 Such an amendment might be
qualified to include only those environmental measures that are related

154. The vote on the 1990 amendments came at an opportune time for supporters of the
CAFE law as Iraq had recently invaded Kuwait and there was increased concern about the price
of oil. Yet, the bill still was not enacted. Fuel Efficiency Effort Defeated in Senate, supra note
153, at 280.
155. Id.; see Sweatin' the Details, Senator Richard Bryan's Proposal to Increase Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, WARD'S AUTO WORLD, Oct. 1989, at 1.
156. Schultz, supra note 4, at 97-98.
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to widely ratified international agreements on the environment." 7 Others
have proposed that GATT panels interpret existing rules differently. It
has been proposed that Article XX(b) be reinterpreted to enable broader
application of environmental measures. 158 Others have suggested requiring GATT panels to reinterpret the meaning of "product" so that products produced by different production methods are not considered "like
products" under Article III. 59 Still others look to other systems that
regulate economic behavior. Some have suggested that the environmental provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
would be useful within the broader WTO system.16 Others have pointed
to the treatment of environmental
law in federal systems like the United
6
States or the EU as a model.' '
B. Proposal: ReinterpretArticle XX(g)
1. Mechanics of the Proposal
This Note proposes that WTO dispute settlement panels interpret
Article XX(g) in a way that makes it a viable exception for laws that
conserve exhaustible natural resources. This would be accomplished by
altering the three step analysis currently employed by GATT panels.
Two of the three steps would be left unchanged and the other step
would be amended. Step one, which examines whether the overall
measure supports the goal of conserving exhaustible natural resources,
would be preserved. Likewise, step three, which provides the "soft"
most favored nation and national treatment requirement, would also
remain the same. Step two, which examines whether the specific challenged provision helps reach the goal of conserving exhaustible resources, would be altered.
Step two would be broken down into two parts. The first part would
follow the current approach. Under part one, the panel would determine
whether the specific challenged provision helps to meet the goal of the
exception. If it does, then the panel would move to step three ("soft"
MFN and national treatment). If the specific provision does not help
meet the goal, the panel would then examine whether the law as a

157. See, e.g., Matthew Hunter Hurlock, Note, The GATE U.S. Law and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GATT in Light of the TunalDolphin Decision, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 2098, 2148 (1992).

158. See Schultz, supra note 4, at 99.
159. See, e.g., id. at 100-01.
160. Cf. id. at 107.
161. See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons From
the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1329 (1992).

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 17:827

whole would help to conserve exhaustible natural resources in a way
that does not on balance provide protection to domestic products. If it
does, then it would proceed to step three; if it does not, then it would
fail.
2. Likely Effect of the Proposal
This approach would enable countries to pass environmental laws
more easily by enabling them to mitigate the harm to domestic producers. Because nearly every environmental law imposes costs on domestic
producers, it consequently damages their competitiveness in comparison
to foreign producers that do not face similar requirements. In large part
because of the harm incurred by domestic producers, many nations are
reluctant to approve environmental laws. The CAFE law is a prime
example. It is a law that on balance probably damages the competitiveness of domestic producers. 162 The fleet accounting provision was added
to help limit the damage. A major irony of the conclusion that the
CAFE law is incompatible with the GATT is that domestic interests,
which are putatively the beneficiaries of the protection, believe that the
law harms them. 63 This proposal, by calling on panels to examine the
law as a whole under Article XX(g), seeks to have panels better appreciate those provisions which do in fact promote the conservation of exhaustible resources. As Part III of this Note argued, the provisions
softening the blow on domestic companies are integral in the effort to
conserve exhaustible resources.
Giving Article XX(g) new life will help to enable nations to limit
the competitive disadvantage they may incur from increased regulation.
This will help to stop any potential race-to-the-bottom among competing
countries." 6 Countries will be less likely to follow other nations down
the path to reduced environmental protection if they are able to mitigate
the cost of the environmental law to their producers. The goal of the

162. See supra part I.A.2.a.
163. See Everett, supra note 33, at IA (quoting United Auto Worker lobbyists as stating

that, "[w]e think for a while the two-fleet idea worked. But the companies in some sense
started standing CAFE on its head.... Now the gaming is costing jobs.").

164. The GAT1IWTO system is premised on the notion of comparative advantage. Trade

rules are designed to permit industry around the world to produce the goods it makes most
efficiently. The result theoretically is the creation of greater wealth and social value. See, e.g.,

supra note 69, at 10-14. One form of comparative advantage protected by the
GATTIWTO system is lower environmental compliance cost. Producers in nations with low
JACKSON,

environmental standards have fewer fixed costs and are in position to produce goods more

cheaply than producers in nations with higher standards. In an effort to ensure that domestic
producers have an opportunity to compete effectively, there is greater pressure to lower
environmental standards. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.

Spring 1996]

World Trade and the Environment: The CAFE Case

proposal advanced here is to ensure that countries will be able to pass
environmental laws that may place their own industry at a competitive
disadvantage to other producers. This can be encouraged by allowing

countries to mitigate the harm of a law by including provisions that may
lessen the cost by favoring domestic industry.
C. Preventing Protectionism
An important goal is to ensure that this proposal does not become a
way to shelter protectionism. After all, every environmental law that is
meant-to apply to domestic producers 65 imposes costs that may damage
competitiveness. Permitting protectionist provisions to be easily tacked
on to these laws might open too large an escape route. Unless it is
limited, the authority of GATT obligations would be undermined." 6 The
proposal offered here limits that possibility.
The proposal does not permit the "protection" to exceed the cost to
domestic industries. To put it differently, in order for a provision to be
saved under this, proposal, the net effect of the law may not be to protect domestic industry from foreign competition as compared to what the
situation would be like without the law. This is a "trade neutral" approach. Admittedly, quantifying the amount of protection is difficult.
But a rough gauge on the effect of trade restrictions is possible. For
example, in the CAFE case, the EC pointed to the level of the fines its
automakers had incurred as one indication of the cost of the law. 167 The
United States might respond that the law as a whole has no net effect on
trade flows. It would be left to the panel to determine which side made
the more compelling argument. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT Agreement), approved as part of the GATT package, calls
68
for panels to make some determination as to a law's effect on trade.
The TBT Agreement calls for a panel to decide whether a law is not
"more trade-restrictive than necessary." 169 Unless one knows how much
a law affects trade, one cannot determine whether an alternative law
would be more restrictive of trade.
By requiring a rough trade neutrality, this proposal does not go
nearly as far as U.S. courts go in allowing burdens on interstate trade. In

165. This is in contrast to domestic law meant to apply extraterritorially, such as the

Marine Mammal Protection Act, supra note 41.
166. Jackson, supra note 68, at 1241.
167. CAFE Panel Report, supra note 5, at para. 3.346.
168. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
supra note 124, at 656.
169. See Schultz, supra note 4, at 99-100 (stating the standard for the TBT Agreement).
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Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery,7 ' for example, the U.S. Supreme
Court evaluated whether the burden on interstate commerce was "'clearly excessive in relation to its putative benefits."" 7' The proposal advanced here rejects the "clearly excessive" test because it might allow
too much protectionism in the name of mitigating harmful effects.
Instead it calls for a more measured "trade neutral" standard. This is
meant to ensure that nations do not abuse the exception.
The potential for abuse can be limited further by requiring that the
objective of the environmental law - reducing greenhouse gases, for
example - is a topic in which there have been widespread international
agreements. 72 Under Article XX(g), this would include laws relating to
global warming, species preservation, and ozone depletion. This is
similar to the approach taken in the NAFTA where the parties listed
173
international environmental agreements that would be given priority.
Panels might take this approach, not because it would be required by a
rule, (which would be extremely hard to enact), 74 but rather as a demonstration of judicial discretion.
In summary, the proposal is designed to create more flexibility and
advance more liberal trade in a system that can be rigid. 175 It is intended
to provide countries some opportunity to mitigate the harmful effects of
their own environmental law in a way that is trade neutral. Under this
proposal, the net result of an environmental law cannot be to favor
domestic producers with regard to foreign producers as a whole. By
limiting the net effect, it avoids slippery slope concerns raised by alternative proposals - such as a broad exception under Article XX for
environmental laws. A much broader exception to allow for environmental protection than even that proposal would allow may be justified.
However, given the opposition of many in the world community to
greater leeway for environmental protection, this approach is measured
and reasonable.
CONCLUSION

The CAFE portion of the panel decision presents a mixed bag to
environmentalists and traders. It certainly does not lay to rest fears about

170. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
171. Id. at 457 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).

172. See Hurlock, supra note 157, at 2148.
173. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 104, 32 I.L.M. 289,

297-98. See Jackson, supra note 68, at 1248; Schultz, supra note 4, at 105.
174. See Schultz, supra note 4, at 96 (indicating that obtaining "definitive interpretation"
of the GATT/WTO under Article IX, paragraph 2 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO is
possible, but difficult).
175. Dunoff, supra note 109, at 1067-70.
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the conflict between GATT obligations and environmental law. The
panel found that significant parts of the CAFE law - a fundamentally
important environmental law - violated the GATT. Amending the law
to bring it into compliance with the GATT would raise a series of
problems both politically and substantively. Political support would
wane because it would place U.S. companies in an even worse position
with regard to its international competitors. The urgency that existed
about the energy crisis has vanished. Though many are concerned about
global warming, many others do not believe it poses a sufficient threat
to justify the cost of the CAFE law. 176 The most important goal of the
law would also be compromised if the law were amended to comply
with the GATT, as U.S. automakers' incentive to develop energy efficient technology would be severely weakened. Market incentives indicate that U.S. automakers would meet the standards by selling small imported cars.
At the same time, the panel report offers support to those who
believe that environmental protection can coexist with the GATT/WTO
system. In particular, the panel's indication that the fleet averaging
provisions might qualify under the exception under Article XX(g) of the
GATT is encouraging. No panel has ever found that the exceptions in
the GATT could sustain an environmental law. To the extent that these
exceptions will provide a meaningful way to build flexibility into the
system to allow environmental protection, the CAFE case is promising.
Finally, the case suggests a way in which Article XX(g) could
plausibly be interpreted to enable nations to exercise broader latitude to
enact environmental law. Under the panel's approach, each element of
the law is examined in isolation to determine whether it directly furthers
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. Ignoring aspects of the
law that result in less favorable treatment to domestic products ignores
real costs associated with environmental protection. One consequence of
the current application of GATT rules may be that nations are reluctant
to approve laws that protect the environment because they will be
unable to soften the competitive harm of the law. There is, unfortunately, no race-to-the-top with regard to environmental protection. Nations
are concerned about the effect environmental laws will have on their
own producers' ability to compete. The proposal contained in this Note
attempts to give real meaning to Article XX(g) so that nations are not
discouraged from enacting laws that protect the environment.

176. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56, and part III.C.

